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Abstract. We analyse how a learner modelling engine that uses belief functions
for evidence and belief representation, called XLM, reacts to different input in-
formation about the learner in terms of changes in the state of its beliefs and the
decisions that it derives from them. The paper covers XLM induction of evidence
with different strengths from the qualitative and quantitative properties of the
input, the amount of indirect evidence derived from direct evidence, and differ-
ences in beliefs and decisions that result from interpreting different sequences of
events simulating learners evolving in different directions. The results here pre-
sented substantiate our vision of XLM is a proof of existence for a generic and
potentially comprehensive learner modelling subsystem that explicitly represents
uncertainty, conflict and ignorance in beliefs. These are key properties of learner
modelling engines in the bizarre world of open Web-based learning environments
that rely on the content+metadata paradigm.
1 Introduction
What makes a good learner model? There are many answers to this question. From
a pragmatic viewpoint, any representation of the learner that supports an educational
system in providing better learning experiences to its users would qualify as a good
learner model [1]. From a more epistemological viewpoint, a good learner model must
capture the significant aspects of a learner, predict her behaviour with accuracy and
explain it convincingly [2]. Consequently, learner models can be evaluated either by the
benefits they bring to educational systems [3], the aspects of learners that they model
[4], their predictive power [5] or their explanatory power [6].
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In this paper we explore the explanatory powers of XLM, a learner modelling en-
gine developed in the LEACTIVEMATH project [7]. XLM uses information on learner
performance to maintain a collection of beliefs on different learner aspects such as their
competencies, meta-cognitive skills, affective and motivational dispositions on a sub-
ject domain—Differential Calculus in the current implementation. XLM explanations
of learner behaviour are the beliefs it holds on the actual levels (values) of these learner
aspects, each belief supported by evidence constructed from interpretations of interac-
tion events. We describe how XLM reacts to different configurations of input informa-
tion about a learner in terms of changes in the interpretation of the input as evidence,
changes in the states of its beliefs and the decisions that it infers from them. We com-
pare XLM responses with our expectations as tutors and designers and make quality
judgements. Our analysis is limited to XLM modelling of mathematical competencies
[8] on the subject domain. Specifically, we analyse:
a) the induction of direct evidence with different strengths depending on the qualita-
tive and quantitative properties of the input (failing or succeeding on a very easy or
very difficult exercise),
b) the amount of indirect evidence derived from direct evidence, and
c) the differences in beliefs and decisions that result from interpreting different se-
quences of events simulating learners evolving in different directions.
We finish the paper discussing outstanding issues, presenting our conclusions from the
work so far and pointing to promising future work.
2 Learner Modelling Process and Belief Representation
XLM is a learner modelling engine for a content+metadata type of system. It combines
a simple issue-based approach [9], in which issues related to content items are identi-
fied in their metadata, with a generic multidimensional framework for learner models
and belief functions as numeric knowledge representations [10, 11]. The mechanisms
involved in the learning modelling process, from interpreting input information to de-
riving the corresponding evidence and finally updating beliefs based on it are sketched
in figure 1.
A mass distribution is a belief function that can be interpreted as a generalised
probability distribution whose domain is not the set of possible values of a variable
but its power set—the set of sets of possible values of the variable. If we call Θ to the
(finite) set of possible values of a variable, then a mass distribution is a function
m : 2Θ → [0,1] such that ∑
X⊆Θ
m(X) = 1.
In XLM, the variables are the learner aspects that it models—a variety of mathematical
competencies, meta-cognitive skills and affective and motivational dispositions. Their
values are levels in a scale of four,
Θ = {I, II, III, IV},
and mass is distributed only among intervals, which are subsets of consecutive levels
(i.e. subsets like ∅ and {I, II, III} but not like {I, II, IV}). Shorthands of the form X2Y
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Fig. 1. The learner modelling process.
are used in this paper to denote intervals (e.g. I2IIIisashorthand f or{I, II, III}) while
a level name will be used to denote either a level or the set containing the level only,
depending on the context. More details of XLM architecture, modelling framework,
knowledge representation and modelling process can be found in [12].
3 Direct Evidence of Different Strength
The interpretation of reports of learner performance in exercises3 is based on the fol-
lowing assumptions:
3 Hereafter we would use exercise to refer either to full exercises or individual steps in them.
a) the more difficult an exercise is, the more probable is to achieve a low performance,
while the opposite holds for easier exercises,
b) exercises designed for learners at higher competency levels are more difficult for
learners at lower competency levels, and
c) we can use a bell-shaped function, parameterised by an estimation of the difficulty
of the exercise and the assumed competency level of the learner, to assign proba-
bilities of performance.
Therefore, we assume that most learners would succeed on easier exercises, particularly
on those aimed at competency levels lower than their own, and would fail on more
difficult exercises, particularly on those aimed at higher competency levels than their
own. Therefore, reports of these happening provide little information to update learner
models and changes should be minimal. On the contrary, reports of failure on easier
exercises and success on more difficult ones are more informative and should have a
stronger impact on learner models.
Table 1. Interpretation of prototypical reports of learner performance.
Mass distribution
Difficulty Level Success ∅ I II III IV I2II II2III III2IV I2III II2IV I2IV
Very easy I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.000
Very difficult IV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.000
Very easy I 0.9 0 0.009 0 0 0 0.016 0 0 0.034 0 0.942
Very difficult IV 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.009 0 0 0.016 0 0.034 0.942
Medium II 0.5 0 0 0.675 0 0 0 0.189 0 0 0 0.135
Very easy I 0 0 0.585 0 0 0 0.333 0 0 0.080 0 0.002
Very difficult IV 1 0 0 0 0 0.585 0 0 0.333 0 0.080 0.002
Table 1 shows the evidence induced from reports of the prototypical extremes of
learner performance mentioned above, plus a couple of close approximations (nearly
succeeding in a very easy exercise and nearly failing in a very difficult one) and an inter-
mediate case of evidence induced from average performance on an exercise of medium
difficulty designed for competency level II. The mass distributions in the first two rows,
induced from the least surprising events, assign all mass to the set {I, II, III, IV}, which
stands for the support the evidence gives to no level in particular, or total ignorance.
These mass distributions can be interpreted as complete lack of evidence, representing
in these cases the knowledge that “everyone succeeds on very easy exercises and fails
on very difficult ones.” The next two rows contain the evidence induced from nearly
succeeding (failing) in a very easy (difficult) exercise. In these cases, some mass have
been taken away from ignorance (set {I, II, III, IV}) and distributed among other sets of
levels. The third row, for example, indicates that nearly top performance in very easy
exercises (success rate = 0.9) is interpreted as the learner being more probably at a
competency level lower than level IV, yet XLM still leaves ample space to the possi-
bility of the learner being actually at level IV. The process of moving mass away from
ignorance reaches its limits in the case of the more informative events (the two rows
at the bottom of the table) where the amount of (mass on) ignorance is minuscule in
comparison to the mass assigned to the singletons {I} and {IV}, respectively, indicat-
ing that the events are interpreted as highly supportive of the learner being at a very
specific competency level. Finally, for the case of the event of medium performance,
the evidence induced is highly supportive of the learner being at the same competency
level the exercise has been designed for, but still including its dose of uncertainty (mass
on {II, III}) and ignorance.
Table 2 contains details of information and decisions that can be inferred from the
mass distributions shown in table 1. These are pignistic distributions, which are prob-
ability distributions derived from mass distributions [11], single value summaries4 and
final decisions on the actual learner levels that would result from beliefs justified only
by the single pieces of evidence in table 1. The table shows that XLM cannot make
decisions under complete ignorance, yet it can be forced to make a decision in very
close cases, as in the third and fourth rows in the table. These rows are interesting also
because they show that currently XLM does not bet on the most probable level (level
I and IV, respectively, in the pignistic distribution) but on the average. Decisions seem
more straightforward in the last three cases which correspond to more informative event
reports.
Table 2. Pignistic distributions, summary beliefs and final decisions on learner level from mass
functions show in table 1.
Event data Pignistic distribution
Difficulty Level Performance I II III IV Summary Decision
very easy I 1.0 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 N/A N/A
very difficult IV 0.0 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 N/A N/A
very easy I 0.9 0.263 0.255 0.247 0.235 2.45 II
very difficult IV 0.1 0.235 0.247 0.255 0.263 2.55 III
medium II 0.5 0.034 0.804 0.128 0.034 2.16 II
very easy I 0.0 0.779 0.193 0.027 0.001 1.25 I
very difficult IV 1.0 0.001 0.027 0.193 0.779 3.75 IV
4 Amount of Indirect Evidence
Table 3 shows how much indirect evidence is generated from the (direct) evidence in-
duced from each one of the events discussed in the previous section. We expected the
amount of indirect evidence to increase significantly from the events conveying less in-
formation to the events conveying more information, and the results shown in the table
4 XLM produces summary beliefs in the range [0,1] which are transformed here linearly to
values in the range [1,4] in order to make them more intuitive.
confirm our expectations. On the other hand, different amounts of indirect evidence are
generated from the (equally) most informative events. An explanation of this happen-
ing is that the very difficult exercise is on derivative, the most connected topic in the
domain map, hence predisposed to produce a large amount of indirect evidence even
on the case of little information (but above the threshold defined in XLM). Finally, the
amount of indirect evidence for the intermediate case falls in between the two extremes,
as expected.
On average, the proportion of direct to indirect evidence in these cases is over 1 : 70.
Assuming XLM can hold around 600 beliefs on mathematical competencies on the
subject domain (around 30 domain topics and 20 competencies) this means that about
nine exercises, evenly mapped onto the domain topics and competencies, would be
required to have at least one piece of evidence (direct or indirect) per belief.
Table 3. Amount of indirect evidence from single direct evidence.
Event data
Difficulty Level Performance Amount of indirect evidence
very easy I 1.0 0
very difficult IV 0.0 0
very easy I 0.9 0
very difficult IV 0.1 0
medium II 0.5 81
very easy I 0.0 115
very difficult IV 1.0 296
5 Beliefs and Sequences of Evidence
Reports of learner performance arrive as information becomes available as learners in-
teract with content. A sequence of reports of learner performance reflects, in principle,
the evolution of the learner as she interacts with the system and its content—learning,
hopefully. XLM uses decay of evidence to account for the assumption that newer re-
ports have more to do with the current state of the learner than old ones. Hence old
evidence loses strength as new evidence accumulates—as if XLM were forgetting it.
In order to observe XLM responses to different sequences of events being reported
we use three base sequences: one standing for improvement, another one standing for
deterioration, and yet another one standing for random performance. Each sequence
consists of seven events, each one reporting the success rate of the learner on an exercise
of medium difficulty at competency level II. In addition, we used two more sequences
derived from the improvement and deterioration sequences by introducing random vari-
ations in the range [−0.1,0.1](figure 2).
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Fig. 3. Evolution of summary belief for all sequences.
Table 4. Final beliefs for all the sequences of events.
Mass distribution
Sequence ∅ I II III IV I2II II2III III2IV I2III II2IV I2IV
Improvement 0 0 0.523 0 0 0 0.168 0 0.001 0.232 0.075
Improvement
with noise
0.252 0 0.292 0.056 0 0 0.097 0.020 0.004 0.205 0.074
Random 0 0 0.742 0 0 0.001 0.069 0 0.002 0.111 0.075
Deterioration
with noise
0 0 0.706 0 0 0.205 0 0 0.036 0 0.053
Deterioration 0 0 0.680 0 0 0.230 0 0 0.036 0 0.054
XLM responses to these sequences are shown in figures 3 and 4, and table 4. The
figures include graphs illustrating the evolution of beliefs on the mathematical compe-
tency of the learner regarding a domain topic addressed by the exercise, using summary
beliefs (figure 3) and pignistic distributions (figure 4) to make changes in the beliefs eas-
ier to visualise. Table 4 contains the full mass distribution for the final belief resulted
from each sequence of events.
It can be seen that XLM reaction to the sequence of evidence standing for improve-
ment is a belief that evolves steadily from something like ‘level II, or perhaps lower’
to something more like ‘most certainly level II, yet may be higher’ as more evidence
accumulate, while still conceding a very small amount of possibility to the case of the
learner being at competency level I. The belief derived from the sequence of evidence
standing for deterioration evolves from something like ‘II or over’ (actually, the sum-
mary belief is very close to level III while a hint of possibility is given to the learner
being at level I) to something like ‘level II, but could be lower.’ The belief for the ran-
dom sequence evolves somehow “in between” the beliefs produced for improvement
and deterioration, strongly favouring level II as expected, given the fact that the exer-
cise is of medium difficulty for competency level II.
The beliefs that result from considering the noisy sequences follow in general the
patterns of the corresponding base sequences. Due to the nature of the noise introduced
(random noise that happens to be more negative than positive, specially for the first half
of events) it accentuates the improvement effect and attenuates the deterioration one,
so that the final belief in the former case considers level III as a strong alternative to
level II (mass in sets {III} and {III, IV}) while in the latter case the support for level II
increases (slightly more mass on {II}) as the support for level I decreases (less mass on
{I, II}).
Finally, the belief resulting from the sequence of improvement with noise (second
row in table 4) assigns one quarter of the mass to the empty set, indicating in this
way that the belief is based on divergent evidence, corresponding in this case to steep
improvement.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the pignistic distribution along the improvement, random and deterioration
sequences, displayed in that order from left to right.
6 Discussion
The current interpretation of reports of learner performance by XLM is based on its
designers’ common sense and some basic mathematical techniques (e.g. bell-shaped
probability assignments resembling normal probability distributions). The evidence and
beliefs that result from the interpretation of the reports look reasonable and mostly
intuitive. They also illustrate how uncertainty and ignorance are represented in belief
functions differently from how they are represented using probability distributions.
A few issues are worth mentioning here. The most important one is perhaps the
lack of theoretical or empirical support to the current interpretation of events, despite
how reasonable it may seem. Although we can justify our approach on the basis of the
great amount of subjectivity in metadata—not necessarily a peculiarity of LEACTIVE-
MATH content—a sounder design of the interpretation process based on some psycho-
metric theories would have its advantages. Another important issue concerns the use of
a learner model in the interpretation of relevant events, which has been avoided in this
paper. Actually, XLM includes two modes for incorporating new evidence into existing
beliefs: an objective mode, in which the strength of new evidence is independent of the
existing beliefs, and a biased mode, in which new evidence is considered on the light of
the existing beliefs—e.g. ‘It is hard to believe that such a good student had such a bad
performance by any other reason than by accident.’ However, the experiments described
in this paper use the objective mode only.
Once all relevant information concerning an event is made available by LEAC-
TIVEMATH, the first step in its interpretation by XLM consists in deriving a probability
distribution from which a mass distribution standing for the evidence is generated [12].
Quite probably this step, which includes both the construction of the probability dis-
tribution and the specific algorithm used for its translation into a mass distribution, is
unnecessary and may have a limiting effect on our use of belief functions as core knowl-
edge representation formalism. Furthermore, the fact that we have resorted to summary
beliefs and pignistic (probability) distributions to describe a core part of XLM behav-
iour, how beliefs change along time, is a consequence of the difficulties to visualise,
apprehend, meaningfully manipulate and produce clear external representations of be-
lief functions. These difficulties have been markedly evident in our efforts to construct
open learner modelling functionality in XLM.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented an analysis of how a new learner modelling engine we
call XLM reacts to changes in the characteristics of its input information. Despite the
fact that our analysis is modest in its coverage of the space of possible input data—in
particular, it does not include the interpretation of input information concerning meta-
cognitive skills nor motivational and affective dispositions—it is suggestive of XLM
responding appropriately to available information regarding learner behaviour.
Further work on the line presented in this paper includes extensive analysis of XLM
response to learner behaviour. For example, the effect on learner models of evidence
propagation as learners course through educational content, differences in learner mod-
els that result from updating beliefs using either the objective or the biased mode, the in-
terpretation of learner actions on an open learner model as evidence for meta-cognitive
skills and the interpretation of learner behaviour for modelling motivational and af-
fective dispositions. We plan also to carry out sensitivity analyses of the collection of
explicit and implicit parameters that control a great deal of XLM behaviour.
We interpret the results presented in this paper as substantiations of our vision of
XLM is a proof of existence for its kind: a generic and potentially comprehensive
learner modelling subsystem that uses belief functions for encoding its beliefs because
they facilitate the explicit representation of uncertainty, conflict and ignorance. These
are key properties of learner modelling engines in the bizarre world of open Web-based
learning environments that rely on the content+metadata paradigm.
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